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Fishery history is still largely mare incognita.  
Few academic scholars venture into these waters, and 
most who do quickly depart.  Harold Innis, Dean Allard, 
and Art McEvoy each wrote one very important study of 
a North American fishery and then nothing more.
1  Their 
peers judged these works excellent, yet the authors still 
fled.  Having myself decided to stick with the fisheries, I 
wonder about this exodus and why American humanities 
cannot sustain interest in the fisheries.  I doubt it is 
intrinsic to North American culture since Canadians 
have created an enviable community of fishery scholars 
within the humanities.
2  Some apathy may result from an 
intersection of professional demands and cultural 
resistance.  In academic environments shaped by publish 
or perish and lorded by colleagues who forget the very 
existence, let alone significance, of extra-terrestrial 
beings such as fishers and sailors, there is no incentive to 
stick with a marginalized topic.  I suspect, though, that 
the complexity of fishery issues is another deterrent. 
One thing distinguishing every outstanding 
fishery history is an effort to embrace the tangle of issues 
surrounding fisheries.  Innis’s study of cod, Allard’s 
work on the U.S. Fish Commission, and McEvoy’s book 
on California reveal complex relations between nature 
and culture and science and politics and economy.  These 
are not just outstanding fishery histories; they are some 
of the best examples we have of interdisciplinary 
research.  Each draws upon a full range of humanities, 
social sciences, and sciences.  Their intellectual 
dividends have been great--but also daunting and 
exhausting.  When I began my work on the salmon 
fisheries, I was actually intimidated by what McEvoy had 
done, and I had great doubts whether I could do 
something similar.  I pressed on only because I cared 
greatly about the subject, but I am not sure how many 
colleagues would do similarly. 
I soon discovered what my predecessors already 
knew:  fisheries blur boundaries.  The material blends 
with the cultural; the social blends with the economic 
and political.  At such moments researchers face vexing 
analytical problems, and their greatest challenge might 
be to resist common sense.  Take overfishing, for 
example.  When fish vanish, we zero in on human 
predation.  This is understandable.  Fishers are the most 
conspicuous threat to fish, and they irresistibly draw our 
attention.  But in fixating on fishing, we can end up 
committing what philosopher Alfred North Whitehead 
called “The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.”  By 
focusing on a definite set of factors, he said, we can 
“arrive at a variety of important truths relating to our 
experience of nature.”  In the fisheries, we see huge 
fleets, sprawling nets, and piles of fish, and we decide 
this is too much.  Overfishing thus helps define a 
problem with vanishing fish, but it can also 
overdetermine our answer by obscuring our attention to 
other issues.  In this case, that which seems straight 
forward and tempts easy conclusion ends up containing 
both more and less than meets the eye.  The research 
challenge is to recognize this trap and resist snap 
answers.
3 
At such moments, researchers will discover both 
the trials and rewards of interdisciplinary research.   
Rejecting simple answers leads toward adopting a much 
broader perspective, often by relying on experts from 
other disciplines.  This is the essence of interdisciplinary 
research, but it contains hidden bargains.  To seek 
answers from other disciplines yet maintain intellectual 
independence, researchers must be able weigh evidence 
critically.  That means--here is the hidden cost--they 
have to master the history and language of those 
disciplines well enough to understand them on their 
terms.  Hard experience has taught me that this is a 
recipe for confusion, frustration, and ibuprofen.  It has 
also been responsible for some of the biggest 
breakthroughs in fishery research.  Thus what I want to 
do is begin with an anecdotal account of my personal 
experiences researching questions about El Niño, and 
then to abstract from them to several general but 




To understand why I became involved with El 
Niño research in the first place--and why it became so 
important to my work, it is first necessary to understand 
something about the way people have remembered the 
Pacific salmon fisheries.  The modern salmon crisis has 
long been scripted in two diametric patterns, as either 
comedy or tragedy.  Government officials have usually 
invoked the former, trumpeting the promises of 
opportunity and technology, while historians have tended 
towards the latter, fixating on failure and oppression.  In 
both cases, the chosen narrative shaped both questions 
and answers about the past, and this includes social 
scientists and scientists as well, since everyone presents 
their research in some form of narrative.  Another way of 
stating my big point here is that telling tales is never a 
purely inductive exercise.
4  All sorts of biases shape our 
stories--even before they are written.  In the case of 
salmon, this has led to many rather similar histories 
about society harming nature or the promise of science 
and technology to ameliorate the vices of society.  I raise 
this point because it very clearly shaped the way I 
initially approached the history of Pacific salmon 
fisheries.  My head already contained a narrative of 
events as I started to read the primary sources.  Like most 
scholars who tell stories about salmon, I already knew 
what had happened. 
And then I had one of those epiphanies that 
made me want to smack my forehead for not realizing it 
sooner.  In 1991 I had published an article on the 
Nestucca River fisheries.  A year later I returned to an 
episode in the article involving a sudden downturn, a 
moment that had seemed like a clear case of overfishing 
for the last seventy years.  When considered in isolation, 
the Nestucca in 1926 did look like a case of greedy 
fishers gone too far.  Spawning habitat was still relatively 
intact, but the number of nets in the river had grown 
inexorably.  When runs declined precipitously, anglers 
blamed local netters and persuaded Oregon legislators to 
prohibit gillnets.  I had focused on the class and spatial 
aspects of this episode, conceding claims of overfishing, 
but when I looked again the local story no longer made 
sense.  The 1926 harvest had plummeted all along the 
coast from Vancouver Island to California.  Attributing 
that decline to synchronous overfishing did not seem 
likely.  Something much bigger must have been at work, 
something like an ocean.
5 
In a wild, completely speculative fashion, I 
wondered if there had been an El Niño in 1926, but I had 
zero clue how to substantiate my hunch.  I did a literature 
review and found a surprising number of articles on the 
mechanics of El Niño and something called the Southern 
Oscillation; other articles discussed the biological 
consequences of El Niño.  Then I discovered a series of 
articles by the late William Quinn, of Oregon State 
University.  Quinn, Victor Neal, and Santiago Atunez de 
Mayolo had listed and ranked the severity of every El 
Niño during the last 450 years.  My first reaction was 
gratitude; my second was to peruse the lists.  Sure 
enough, there had been an El Niño in 1925-1926.  Even 
better, Quinn ranked it as “very strong,” on the same 
order of intensity as the global event in 1983-1984.  I 
thought, “how convenient.”  Harvests in 1926 had all the 
same markings of the 1983-1984 event.  I broadened my 
review of harvest and El Niño records and found 
correlations between bad years and El Niños in 1877, 
1899, and 1957.  I started dreaming of major historical 
revisions.
6 
I now call this my infatuation period with 
interdisciplinary research.  My initial phase was pure 
enthusiasm.  This interdisciplinary stuff was great--and 
easy too.  My case was made.  The records proved it.  I 
was deeply into a case of misplaced concreteness.  Yet 
nothing was quite what it seemed, and flaws soon 
emerged as my familiarity with the records grew.  Quinn 
had ranked all El Niños in four categories:  weak, 
moderate, strong, or very strong.  When I reflected on 
these phrases, I began to wonder what “very strong” 
really meant.  What really was the difference between 
“very strong” and just plain “strong,” and between those 
and “moderate” El Niños?  I sensed a lot of imprecision 
in this terminology, and I needed clarification.  I wrote to 
Quinn but got no answer.  When I tried again I learned 
that he was very ill and then dead.  I briefly toyed with 
dropping the line of inquiry, but that lasted maybe an 
hour because I figured that El Niños had happened in the 
past and that at least some of them may have had a 
major, if episodic, impact on regional salmon runs. 
I had no idea where to turn for help, however, so 
at first I just plowed ahead alone.  I went back to the 
Southern Oscillation (SO) and El Niño literature.  I tried 
to absorb the sprawling interpretations of atmospheric 
scientists and physical and biological oceanographers.  I 
spent two months reading everything I could find, but I 
discovered that even experts were struggling to 
understand El Niño.  Only a couple articles limned the 
impact of earlier major El Niños in 1877 and 1925, and 
no one was asking the sort of historical questions about 
salmon that interested me.  It was then I realized with a 
shudder that I might have to do this research from 
scratch.  By late-1993 I was seriously adrift and in need 
of help.  It was at this point that I wandered through the 
University of Washington’s School of Fisheries trying to 
locate help.  Jim Anderson pushed me to Tom Quinn; 
Quinn steered me to Ray Hilborn; for some reason 
Hilborn sent me to Kai Lee; and Lee said, “You need to 
talk to Wooster.”  “Who?”, I asked.  “Warren Wooster,” 
he replied.  “If you’ve got a question about El Niño, he’s 
your guy.  He knows everything about that stuff.” 
So I trundled down to the Marine Affairs 
Building to see this guy named Wooster.  I was so 
obsessed that I walked into his office, sat down, and 




SO and salmon runs and 1926 and how confused I was 
and nobody was asking the questions I wanted answered.  
Wooster finally leaned over and asked, “Son, what’s your 
name?”  We spent the next five minutes introducing 
ourselves and explaining what we did.  It took a while for 
Wooster to realize I was in history and not fisheries, but 
then he began to teach.  He suggested some basic texts, 
showed me a NOAA website that graphically illustrated 
current sea surface temperatures across the Pacific basin, 
and briefly explained the history of ideas about El Niño 
and the SO.  The one idea he kept going back to was how 
complex and contingent El Niños were, and how 
incomplete our knowledge was.  Unbeknownst to me, I 
was asking some very complicated questions.  Wooster 
warned me that I might not be able to answer all of them, 
but he steered me to historical databases on sea surface 
height and sea temperature that might help me gauge 
some events.  He also encouraged me to come back when 
I had more ideas or questions. 
That first meeting with Wooster taught me three 
critical lessons about interdisciplinary research.  The first 
was that unmediated knowledge can be a dangerous 
thing.  I had read a lot of theories about El Niños with no 
way to discriminate between authors or publications.   
Wooster spent a great deal of time disabusing certain 
theories, qualifying others, and always reminding me that 
scientists were still learning how complex the 
interactions were between the oceans and atmosphere.   
The second lesson was the importance of personal 
contacts with other fields.  Kai Lee was wrong on one 
point:  Wooster did not know everything, but he often 
knew who did.  Through Wooster I gained access to a 
huge cohort of experts on ocean and atmospheric climate.  
Wooster and David Fluharty schooled me on El Niño and 
the SO.  Robert Francis and Steven Hare showed me 
drafts of a major paper on long-term fluctuations in the 
North Pacific fisheries.  Michael Wallace and Nathan 
Mantua essentially gave me private tutorials on 
atmospheric engines.  None of this would have happened 
without having first established a rapport with Warren 
Wooster. 
The third lesson from that first meeting was that 
I might have to accept a lot of uncertainty, that I might 
not be able to answer all my questions, but that I could 
pursue them.  I had both the ability and critical help 
necessary to make sense of other fields.  It is this last 
point that I stress endlessly to my students.  Scholars 
cannot dabble in other disciplines.  They must go at it 
whole hog, or they will surely make mistakes that their 
peers will spot.  Another way of saying this is that 
complex subjects are sure tickets to hard labor--one of the 
factors that may dissuade historians from the fisheries.  
Mastering a second, third, or fourth discipline is never 
easy, but it is much easier with help from within.   
Hilborn, Wooster, Francis, and Mantua were 
indispensable to my education.  Without them, I would 
have made many errors and overstatements; with them, it 
was fun to find materials, generate ideas, and refine 
answers. 
Yet I need to play Polonius for a moment and 
add a caveat.  Guides are essential, but they can hinder as 
well as help.  In recent years scholars have grown 
skeptical of objective truth.  We are increasingly willing 
to admit that bias is intrinsic to social knowledge.   
Private ambition, community norms, and institutional 
agendas shape both the questions we ask and the 
interpretations we adopt, and most academic disciplines 
are riven by politics, especially the sciences.  Yet for all 
our awareness, researchers in the humanities and social 
sciences too often still accept science at face value.  Over-
credulity can become another trap when establishing 
close links with experts, so while familiarity is important, 
it is best not to get too close.  Remember that allies also 
grind axes, and be as critical of their advice as you would 
a colleague in your own field.  The best prophylactic is to 
read widely, and be well versed on the big debates in a 
discipline.  Know the history of its development, ideas, 
major questions, and dominant institutions.  In all 
endeavors be an educated and discriminating spectator.  
In other words, “To thine own self be true.”
7 
This is not easy or comforting.  For ten years I 
tried to measure my own ideas and my guides’ counsels.  
During that period I mined many archives, and 150 
years’ of regional newspapers, government reports, and 
scholarly journals.  For my labors I got a lot of 
conflicting information.  I had experts tell me that dams 
posed no threat to salmon, that there was no difference 
between wild and hatchery fish, that El Niño and decadal 
warming trends were statistical anomalies, and that 
oceans or dams or fishers or Indians or loggers or 
grazers  or irrigators or urbanites or environmentalists 
were the real problems.  Every expert had an opinion, 
and no theory went uncontested.  Yet as absurd as some 
claims seemed, sorting through them was far from easy 
because each came from a sincere researcher with solid 
credentials, and every explanation held at least a grain of 
truth.  The more I listened, the murkier the past 
appeared. 
So how did I handle conflicting advice?   
Historian Theodore Porter has a great phrase for the 
modern trend of quantification:  he calls it a “strategy of 
irresponsibility.”  Trust in numbers, he says, allows 
authorities seemingly to shift responsibility for their 
actions to outside experts, yet in the end politicians still 
make the decisions.  The same is true for 
interdisciplinary research.  I relied on experts to help 
understand material reality, but in the end I alone had to 
decide who made sense.  In each case, though, I tried to 
acknowledge such contests because uncertainty itself 
seemed to be part of the story, as did the tendency of 
politicians to embrace some strategies despite their 




uncertainties.  I made a lot of this angle, but I still had to 
make some conclusions about what had happened to 
salmon in the material world.  To do that, I did have to 
choose among competing claims.
8 
This actually turned out to be easier than I 
feared, but only because I could escape another trap.  The 
morsels of truth I previously mentioned proved crucial 
because complexity itself was a key.  In the case of El 
Niño, the evidence for a broad but incidental warming 
event such as a major El Niño was quite persuasive in 
1877, the 1890s, and 1926.  Other possible events listed 
in Quinn’s publications did not have the sort of 
supporting local evidence that made these other dates 
persuasive.
9  Combined with other evidence, my research 
suggested that the salmon crisis was in fact very old with 
many contributing factors, yet the literature and political 
rhetoric ran in the other direction, focusing almost 
exclusively on single issues in the present.  Rather than 
follow my predecessors and choose among competing 
claims, as if I could possible isolate blame, I tried to lay 
out all of the claims and show where each made sense but 
was also simplistic.  Out of this came a very different 
narrative, one in which the salmon crisis was neither 
linear nor singular, nor did it contain unambiguous 
villains or simple solutions.  Out of this came another 
insight about how American political discourse simplifies 
problems into binary choices.  My interdisciplinary 
approach to a fishing decline in 1926 helped me realize 
that the very way Americans talk about environmental 
issues has also been part of the problem.
10 
My experiences with interdisciplinary research 
have forced me to grow comfortable with ambiguity, and 
because of that I now tend to emulate a scale when I talk, 
always weighing factors on both sides of an issue.  Thus 
as I talk about interdisciplinarity, I want to give equal 
time to both the costs and opportunities.  My research led 
me through many perspectives, with many conclusions.  
As I grow familiar with each discipline, I learn to 
discriminate between the useful and the loopy.  I have 
also adjusted to the reality of uncertainty in scientific 
research.  There are many costs to this approach.  The 
expenditure of time and energy has been significant, the 
confusion distressing, the complexity frustrating.  These 
are real problems, but studies like Arthur McEvoy’s The 
Fisherman’s Problem reveal why it should be 
encouraged.  McEvoy helped demonstrate that the 
science used to manage fisheries was itself embedded in 
multiple environments of resource, institutional, and 
economic politics.  The consequences for people and 
nature cannot be understood apart from these issues, but 
understanding all of the factors requires a lot of hard 
work.  Interdisciplinary research takes a lot of dedication 
and sweat, but the intellectual rewards are great. 
To be bluntly honest, the social opportunities 
and costs are equally great.  The way I learned to do 
interdisciplinary research resulted in a very different 
narrative.  My history of the salmon crisis is unavoidably 
messier than past tellings, but I think it’s also more 
interesting.  Others disagree, and although I’ve received 
praise from my peers, I have also been reviled from all 
quarters.  Some fishers accuse me of treason; some 
industrialists suspect I’m a radical environmentalist and 
an opponent of progress; some environmentalists think 
I’m an apologist for capitalistic destruction; and one 
author on salmon sneers that I’m a “social 
constructionist.”  The professional rewards are 
gratifying, but friction has been an intrinsic element of 
that bargain.  I do not know how many others would wish 
this bumpy ride, but I hope at least a few will.  There are 
still huge opportunities and many ambitious projects in 
the fisheries, and vast stores of information are collecting 
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